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THE CONSTITUTION'S FORGOTTEN COVER
LETTER: AN ESSAY ON THE NEW
FEDERALISM AND THE ORIGINAL
UNDERSTANDING
Daniel A. Farber*

I.

INTRODUCTION

At the end of the summer of 1787, the Philadelphia Convention
issued two documents. One was the Constitution itself. The other
document, now almost forgotten even by constitutional historians,
was an official letter to Congress, signed by George Washington on
behalf of the Convention.1 Congress responded with a resolution
that the Constitution and "letter accompanying the same" be sent
to the state legislatures for submission to conventions in each state.2
The Washington letter lacks the detail and depth of some other
evidence of original intent. Being a cover letter, it was designed
only to introduce the accompanying document rather than to plumb
its meaning. But the letter's official nature gives it a status not
shared by Madison's personal notes or newspaper editorials such as
the Federalist Papers. As we will see, the Washington letter contains significant clues about the nature of the document that the
Convention was placing before the country. Although it cannot
supplant other, more traditional sources, it can help to illuminate
the original understanding of the Framers.3
Recourse to this source is particularly appropriate now, in a
year when we have twice been admonished to return to the "first

* Acting Associate Vice-President for Academic Affairs, Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
B.A. 1971, M.A. 1972, J.D. 1975, Illinois. - Ed. I would like to thank Jim Chen, Phil
Frickey, Mark Killenbeck, Mike Paulsen, Jeff Powell, and Suzanna Sherry for their helpful
comments.
1. See Letter of the President of the Federal Convention to the President of Congress
(Sept. 17, 1787), in FORMATION OF TilE UNION OF TilE AMERICAN STATES 1003 (Charles C.
Tansill ed., 1927). A complete copy of the letter can be found in the Appendix to this essay.
2. See Resolution of Congress of September 28, 1787, Submitting the Constitution to the
Several States, in FORMATION OF nm UNION, supra note 1, at 1007.
3. Except where the context makes it important to draw a distinction, this essay uses the
tenn Framers to refer to both the Philadelphia Convention and the ratifiers.
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principles" of federalism. 4 On one of these occasions, departing
from almost sixty years of past practice, the Court ruled that Congress had exceeded its power to regulate private activity under the
Commerce Clause.5 In the other case, only the defection of Justice
Kennedy prevented the same block of Justices from holding that
ultimate sovereignty lies in the people of the individual states,
rather than in a single national populace.6 "We, the People," according to these Justices, means "we the peoples of the various
states," rather than "We the American people."?
It is only fair to consider the extent to which these "first principles" are congruent with the views of those who framed the Constitution. But the multitude of available sources, many of them
conflicting, ambiguous, or unreliable, complicates this inquiry. The
Convention's cover letter provides useful assistance because of its
official standing as the unanimous public expression of the Convention's views. In this respect, it compares quite favorably with
Madison's notes, which were not available to the public until many
years later, and with the Federalist Papers, which presented the unofficial views of two prominent delegates.s Further, because it
seems to have been regarded as noncontroversial, both in the Convention and elsewhere, it may help illuminate the most important of
understandings - those that were considered too clear to require
discussion.
This essay uses the Washington letter to test current assertions
about the original understanding of federalism. Part II of the essay
explores the New Federalism- the emerging conservative theory
of federalism. Although the New Federalism had its most dramatic
impact in Lopez and its most radical expression in the Term Limits
dissent, it began in a series of earlier opinions and in the work of
conservative constitutional theorists. Part II traces this development. Part III then considers the significance of the Washington
letter in more detail. As Part III explains, recent conservative writings about interpretation provide strong reasons to reassess the
traditional obscurity of the Washington letter. With these preliminaries out of the way, Part IV uses the Washington letter to
4. See United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. a. 1842, 1875 (1995) (Thomas,
J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez,
115 s. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
5. See Lopez, 115 S. a. at 1653 (Souter, J., dissenting).
6. See Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1875.
7. See 115 S. Ct. at 1876 n.l.
8. With the minor exception of the handful of Federalist Papers authored by John Jay.
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probe three elements of the New Federalism: its understanding of
the scope of national power; its concept of sovereignty; and its vision of the states as safeguards against the federal government.
Part V contains some brief closing thoughts about the Washington
letter and the New Federalism.
In general, the Washington letter supports the arguments of historians who have attributed a more nationalist spirit to the Framers
than that contemplated by the New Federalists.9 To the extent that
their goal is to keep faith with the spirit of the Framers, the New
Federalists seem to have struck a somewhat dissonant chord. If the
burden of proof is on the New Federalists to justify a change in
current law, they have failed to carry that burden.to
It is important to bear in mind the limited extent of the current
dispute over federalism. The Constitution undeniably contemplates
the existence of the states as important elements of the structure of
government. The federal government clearly was the recipient of
enumerated powers, and any remaining powers of government
were reserved to the states. But the question is how to construe
that reservation to the states.
We might analogize the reserved powers of the state to the
share of a residuary legatee in a will. On the one hand, the Framers
may have thought it critically important that the states retain substantial regulatory autonomy. If so, courts have reason to construe
the specific bequests so as to maintain a substantial residue. That is
the New Federalist view. Or perhaps the states were more like a
charity chosen for tax purposes to inherit the residue of the estate
- here, that being whatever powers happened to be left over or
whatever authority Congress chose not to exercise. Although the
Framers may have expected the residuary bequest to be large,
maintaining its size may not have been an important goal of their
constitutional testament. If so, it should play little role in construing the specific bequests. In approaching this question, it is helpful
to understand the overall "estate plan," which in this case is clarified to some degree by the Washington letter, as well as the place of
the residuary legatees in the testator's affections.

9. See infra text accompanying notes 64-69.
10. I wish to emphasize that this essay is critical rather than synthetic. That is, it sets
forth counterarguments to the arguments made by the New Federalists and attempts to show
that their arguments are unpersuasive. But even assuming that the essay successfully makes
its case, that does not establish that the conclusions drawn by the New Federalists are incorrect, only that they are poorly supported.
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THE NEW FEDERALISM

A. The Origins of the New Federalism
The New Federalism did not emerge full-grown in the 1994
Term. Instead, it was an outgrowth of conservative jurists' and
scholars' continuing concern over federal invasions of state
prerogatives.
This concern surfaced dramatically two decades before Lopez in
National League of Cities v. Usery,ll which, like Lopez, was authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist. With Justice Blackmun providing the somewhat unenthusiastic fifth vote, Justice Rehnquist held
that applying the federal minimum wage to certain state employees
unconstitutionally invaded the "attributes of sovereignty attaching
to every state government." 12 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Assn., 13 the Court articulated a three-part test based
on League of Cities, which it then applied to uphold federal regulation of strip mining. According to Hodel, to be struck down for
exceeding congressional power, a statute must regulate the "States
as States," it must "address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty,' " and it must directly impair" 'integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.' " 14 Note
the emergence of two themes of the New Federalism: reverence
toward state sovereignty and protectiveness toward traditional state
functions.1s
The Hodel test, in practice, proved fatal to state claims of immunity. Following Hodel, the Court unanimously held that federal
regulation of state-owned railroads "does not impair a state's ability
to function as a state."16 Then, the Court narrowly upheld a federal
statute requiring state utility commissions to consider certain methods of energy conservationP Finally, a closely divided Court upheld the application to state park employees of a federal ban on
compulsory retirement.1s
426 u.s. 833 {1976).
426 U.S. at 845.
452 u.s. 264 {1981).
452 U.S. at 287-88 (citations omitted).
In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist suggested - ominously, in retrospect that the Court should give more serious consideration to whether congressional regulation,
even of private parties, falls within the Commerce Clause. 452 U.S. at 310.
16. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 686 {1982).
17. See Federal Energy Regulatory Commn. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 {1982).
18. The Court agreed that park management is a traditional state function but held that
the third prong of Hodel was not met because eliminating mandatory retirement would have
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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Ultimately
to complete this oft-told story - Justice
Blackmun thought better of his vote in League of Cities and wrote
the majority opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 19 which overruled League of Cities. The thrust of the
Garcia opinion is that the Constitution indeed does presume the
existence of independently functioning state governments but that
the primary safeguard against federal interference is structural.2 o
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Garcia broached a theme that was
to figure heavily in later New Federalist opinions. She argued that
the Framers viewed the commerce power as "important but limited,
and expected that it would be used primarily if not exclusively to
remove interstate tariffs and to regulate maritime affairs and largescale mercantile enterprise. " 21 To protect the basic federal scheme
in an era when interstate commerce has mushroomed, Justice
O'Connor suggested, the Court needed to defend at least the internal operations of the state government from federal regulation.
Commentators generally assumed, as Justice O'Connor had, the
validity of the general expansion of federal legislative power. The
problem was to protect the independent policymaking role of the
states in a world in which the threat of federal preemption was, by
common agreement, virtually omnipresent.22 Among other possibilities, the Guarantee Clause was invoked as a basis for this
process-based protection for states' rights.23
Despite League of Cities and the Garcia dissent, states' rights
had not been a particularly prominent part of conservative jurisprudence. No less a conservative than Robert Bork had represented
the federal government in League of Cities. 24 Even in 1982, such
only a marginal effect on the state's ability to operate its parks efficiently. See EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 {1983).
19. 469 u.s. 528 {1985).
20. This argument stems from HERBERT WECHSLER, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 49-82 (1961). For a somewhat skeptical appraisal of this argument, see Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1485 (1994).
21. 469 U.S. at 583.
22. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 {1988); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to
Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 341.
23. See Charles L. Black, Jr., On Worrying About the Constitution, 55 U. CoLO. L. REv.
469 {1984); Merritt, supra note 22. Note that Merritt does not want to contract federal regulatory power, only to maintain "republican" state governments.
24. Bork argued the case as Solicitor General. See National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 834 (1976). But see RoBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
PoLITICAL SEoucnoN oF nm LAw 184 (1990) (arguing that the Tenth Amendment guarantees federalism).
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prominent conservatives as Charles Fried and Antonin Scalia were
notably unenthusiastic about states' rights.25 Fried suggested that
the seeds of the current federal dominance may have been present
from the beginning,26 while Scalia's peroration took an unabashedly
nationalist stand: "I urge you, then - as Hamilton would have
urged you - to keep in mind that the federal government is not
bad but _good. The trick is to use it wisely."27
In the late 1980s, however, some conservative theorists began to
take a more vigorous stance in defense of the states. Raoul Berger
continued his campaign for unadulterated originalism with a book
on federalism. 28 Berger's book anticipates the later views of Justice
Thomas on several key points: that the states predated the federal
government and retained their separate sovereign existence after
ratification;29 that the Commerce Clause extends only to trade
across state lines;30 and that the Supreme Court's Commerce
Clause doctrines are ripe for reevaluation.31 Similarly, Richard
Epstein argued that "the Ford Motor Company did not manufacture goods in interstate commerce, but the Northern Pacific Railroad shipped them in interstate commerce."32 Epstein concluded in
no uncertain terms that the Commerce Clause should be limited to
"interstate transportation, navigation and sales, and the activities
closely incident to them. All else should be left to the states."33 A
third effort to rethink federalism took a markedly less radical tone.
In a review of Berger's book, Michael McConnell attempted to
make the intellectual case for federalism. 34 He stressed the potential practical benefits of federalism but gave more emphasis to the
role of federalism in protecting individual rights and preserving local self-rule.35
25. See Charles Fried, Federalism- Why Should We Care?, 6 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POLY. 1
(1982); Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 19 (1982).
26. See Fried, supra note 25, at 2.
27. Scalia, supra note 25, at 22.
28. See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERAUSM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN {1987).
29. See id. at 32-34.
30. See id. at 125.
31. See id. at 166-70. Notably, Berger does concede that it is probably impractical to root
out all of the federal regulatory structure that has accumulated over the decades, but at least
a freeze on further expansion, if not some pruning, is required. See id. at 178-80.
32. Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387,
1442 {1987).
33. Id. at 1454.
34. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1484 (1987) {book review). For contrary arguments, see Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903 (1994).
35. See McConnell, supra note 34, at 1500-07.
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It was only in the early 1990s that the conservative Justices returned to the task of reinvigorating federalism. The opening salvo
was Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Gregory v.
Ashcroft. 3 6 The issue in Gregory was whether the ADEA37 applied
to certain state judges. Justice O'Connor took advantage of the occasion to delve into the theory of federalism. 38 The principal benefit of the "constitutionally mandated balance of power"39 between
the two levels of government is that it prevents government abuse
and protects individual liberty:
If this "double security" is to be effective, there must be a proper
balance between the States and the Federal Government. These twin
powers will act as mutual restraints only if both are credible. In the
tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.
The Federal Government holds a decided advantage in this delicate balance: the Supremacy Clause. As long as it is acting within the
powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress may impose its
will on the States. Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States. This is an extraordinary power in a federalist
system.40
Although Gregory was purportedly only a statutory interpretation
case,41 its constitutional overtones were clear.
Justice O'Connor had the opportunity to apply her :theory in a
purely constitutional setting in New York v. United States. 42 Reinforcing her discussion of the values of federalism in Gregory, Justice
O'Connor ruled that direct federal coercion of states can never be
allowed, regardless of the strength of the government's regulatory
interest.4 3 This holding, notably, elevates state sovereignty over
36. 501 u.s. 452 (1991).
37. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988)).
38. Describing the states and the federal government as "joint sovereigns," she argued
that this structure "assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the
diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in
democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and
it makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry." 501 U.S. at 458 (citing McConnell, supra note 34, at 1493-500, and Merritt, supra
note 22, at 3-10).
39. 501 U.S. at 458 (citations omitted).
40. 501 U.S. at 459-60 (citation omitted). Note Justice O'Connor's obvious discomfort
with the Supremacy Clause, which she apparently considers somewhat at odds with her idea
of a normal federalist system.
41. Based on this vision of federalism, the Court held that it would construe a federal
statute to regulate the qualifications of state officials only if it was unambiguously required
by a plain statement to that effect- a statement that was lacking in Gregory. See 501 U.S. at
470.
42. 505 u.s. 144 (1992).
43. At issue was whether Congress could force states to establish programs for disposing
of low-level radioactive waste, at penalty of "taking title" to the waste if they failed to enact
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such less substantial interests as racial equality and freedom of
speech, both of which can be impaired on the basis of a sufficiently
compelling government interest.
B. The New Federalism Comes of Age
In 1995, the New Federalism broke out of the limited area of
state immunity. Each of the recent opinions - the Term Limits
dissent and the majority and concurring opinions in Lopez- elaborates on different aspects of the New Federalism and deserves individual attention.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Lopez is
predominantly doctrinal. At the outset, however, Chief Justice
Rehnquist does advert to "first principles." Relying on Madison's
characterization of federal powers as "few and defined" while state
powers are "numerous and indefinite," Justice Rehnquist then
quoted from Gregory about the role of this division of powers in
preserving liberty.44 Admittedly, he added, the scope of federal
power had greatly increased in the post-New Deal era, partly because of the "great changes" in the economy and partly because of
a desire to eliminate what were considered artificial restraints on
federal power.45 Having analyzed the post-New Deal case law,
however, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the school gun law at
issue in Lopez46 did not fall squarely within the previously recognized scope of congressional power. He declined to expand that
scope any further.
The concurring opinions have more theoretical substance. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, reiterated the Gregory
vision of federalism as a protection for individual liberty.47 The
statute before the Court, he concluded, "upsets the federal balance
to a degree that renders it an unconstitutional assertion of the commerce power."48 Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggests that the
Court should preserve the current balance between the states and
such a program on schedule. See 505 U.S. at 174-77. The statute is obviously designed to
deal with the NIMBY syndrome (Not in My Back Yard): every state wanted to generate lowlevel waste in local medical facilities, but every state wanted some other state to take the
responsibility for providing a site for disposal. For an argument in favor of upholding the
statute, see Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1001 (1995).
44. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. a. 1624, 1626 (1995).
45. See 115 S. a. at 1628.
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
47. See 115 S. a. at 1638-39.
48. 115 s. a. at 1640.
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the federal government rather than begin a rollback of federal
power.49 Justice Kennedy concluded that the statute intruded on
state sovereignty and that, in the absence of a stronger link with
commercial concerns, "that interference contradicts the federal balance the Framers designed and that this Court is obliged to
enforce. "5°
If Justice Kennedy offered qualified support for the majority,
Justice Thomas clearly believed that the majority had not gone far
enough. Like Epstein and Berger,51 he argued that modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence is almost wholly illegitimate. His analysis rests on two premises. First, commerce consists only of sales
transactions and transportation in connection with those transactions.52 Second, agriculture, manufacturing, and most other areas
of life should be subject only to state regulation.53 Epstein and
Berger, who had seemed far outside the mainstream a few years
before, now had the solid support of at least one Justice.
Maybe more than just one: Justice Thomas's dissent in the Term
Limits case was equally audacious, but here he spoke for four Justices. Term Limits involved a state's power to set term limits for
members of Congress. The majority view was that this power pertained solely to the new government created by the Constitution
rather than to any preexisting state authority. Hence, the majority
said, this power was not "reserved" by the Tenth Amendment. In
the course of this discussion, Justice Stevens's majority opinion explains the conventional view of state and federal sovereignty.
Under the Articles of Confederation, " 'the States retained most of
their sovereignty, like independent nations bound together only by
49. See 115 S. a. at 1638-39 (stating that citizens need to be able to identify those responsible for government action and should be able to rely on the traditional boundaries between
the activities of federal and state governments); 115 s. a. at 1640 (claiming that the gun
control Act was objectionable because it invades a traditional area of state regulation,
education).
50. 115 s. a. at 1642.
51. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
52. See 115 S. a. at 1643-44.
53. According to Justice Thomas, the exchanges during the ratification campaign reveal
the relatively limited reach of the Commerce Clause and federal power:
The Founding Fathers confirmed that most areas of life (even many matters that would
have substantial effects on commerce) would remain outside the reach of the Federal
Government. Such affairs would continue to be under the exclusive control of the
States.
• . . [D]espite being well aware that agriculture, manufacturing, and other matters
substantially affected commerce, the founding generation did not cede authority over all
these activities to Congress. Hamilton, for instance, acknowledged that the Federal
Government could not regulate agriculture and like concerns ....
115 S. Ct. at 1645.
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treaties,'" but the new Constitution "reject[ed] the notion that the
Nation was a collection of States, and instead creat[ed] a direct link
between the National Government and the people of the United
States."54 A patchwork of local qualifications for federal office,
Justice Stevens argued, would "sever the direct link that the Framers found so critical between the ·National Government and the
people of the United States."ss
Justice Thomas's dissent squarely rejects this vision of national
sovereignty: "Because the majority fundamentally misunderstands
the notion of 'reserved' powers, I start with some first principles."56
The most basic of these first principles, according to Justice
Thomas, is this: "The ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the
consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole."57
Despite the adoption of the Constitution, "the people of each State
retained their separate political identities. "58 Even in language
where others have found an affirmation of national unity, Justice
Thomas found a reaffirmation of the fundamental status of the
states as compared with the Nation:
The ringing initial words of the Constitution - "We the People of
the United States" - convey something of the same idea. (In the
Constitution, after all, "the United States" is consistently a plural
noun.") The Preamble that the Philadelphia Convention approved
before sending the Constitution to the Committee of Style is even
clearer. It began: "We the people of the States of New-Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia .... " Scholars
have suggested that the Committee of Style adopted the current language because it was not clear that all the States would actually ratify
the Constitution.s9
In short, Justice Thomas said, the concept of popular sovereignty

underlying the Constitution "tracks" rather than erases state lines.6o
He found it senseless to interpret the Tenth Amendment as reserving powers to the "undifferentiated people of the Nation as a
whole, because the Constitution does not contemplate that those
54. Term Limits, 115 S. a. at 1855 (citations omitted).
55. 115 s. a. at 1864.
56. 115 S. Ct. at 1875.
57. 115 S. Ct. at 1875.
58. 115 s. a. at 1877.
59. 115 S. Ct. at 1876 n.1 (citations omitted). Following Justice Thomas's interpretation, a
more accurate wording might have been, "We the Peoples of the United States."
60. See 115 S. a. at 1877.
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people will either exercise power or delegate it. The Constitution
simply does not recognize any mechanism for action by the undifferentiated people of the Nation."61
Justice Kennedy, who had provided the crucial fifth vote in
Lopez, refused to go along with Justice Thomas's view of state sovereignty in Term Limits. In his view, the heart of the legitimacy of
the federal government is "that it owes its existence to the act of the
whole people who created it." 62 Although the Framers, in his view,
were "solicitous of the prerogatives of the States," the states could
not be allowed to interfere with the exercise of federal powers or
with "the most basic relation between the National Government
and its citizens, the selection of legislative representatives."63
To summarize, the New Federalism has three major premises.
The first tenet is that the states retain crucial aspects of sovereignty.
Sovereignty is a concept we usually identify with independent nations.64 To attribute sovereignty to the states is in some degree to
assign them some aspect, if only residual, of nationhood. In the
strongest version, that espoused by Raoul Berger and the four Term
Limits dissenters, the sovereignty of the states is actually primary.
The states came before the federal government, and they remain
more fundamental to the constitutional scheme than the federal
government, which is a creature of the separate peoples of the individual states. A weaker version of this premise is that state sovereignty coexists with federal sovereignty.
The second tenet derives from the recognition that, under the
Supremacy Clause, federal power prevails where federal and state
power overlap. Hence, if the states are to have some form of sovereignty, they must have some sphere of exclusive power or, at the
very least, a sphere that the federal government can only enter
under special circumstances. In the older version of the New Federalism - from League of Cities through Gregory - that separate
61. 115 s. Ct. at urn.
62. 115 S. Ct. at 1872; see also 115 S. Ct. at 1873.
63. 115 S. Ct. at 1873. As this disagreement between Justice Kennedy and the other
members of the conservative wing of the Court indicates, the New Federalism is not a monolith. Interestingly enough, Justice Kennedy's arguments are very similar in structure to John
Marshall's arguments about the Commerce Clause. Felix Frankfurter wrote that "Marshall's
use of the commerce clause greatly furthered the idea that though we are a federation of
states we are also a nation, and gave momentum to the doctrine that state authority must be
subject to such limitations the Court finds it necessary to apply for the protection of the
national community." FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CoMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARsHALL,
TANEY AND WHITE 18-19 (1937).
64. See Rapaczynski, supra note 22, at 349-50 (explaining that the least problematic example of sovereignty is an independent nation; the use of the concept of sovereignty in federalism discussions derives from this paradigm case).
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sphere was the internal operation of the state government. The
various majority Justices in Lopez made different efforts to redefine
the state sphere. Chief Justice Rehnquist essentially defined it by
exclusion and claimed that the state sphere consisted of all areas
that are not assigned to the federal government. In tum, he defined
federal competence to cover three broad categories: regulation of
the channels of interstate commerce; protection of interstate instrumentalities even from intrastate interference; and control of economic activities "having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce."65 Justices Kennedy and O'Connor defined the sphere
of presumptive state autonomy as consisting of noncommercial activities traditionally regulated by the states. 66 Taking the broadest
view of state sovereignty, Justice Thomas set aside regulation of
manufacturing and agriculture for the states along with jurisdiction
over all activities other than the interstate sale and shipment of
goods.
Finally, the New Federalism holds that the states are not merely
a structural feature of our governmental system but an important
affirmative good in need of protection. For the New Federalists,
the states are not simply a fact of life in our democracy. Rather, in
the suggestive words of Robert Nagel, federalism is a fundamental
value.67 In particular, in order to safeguard individual liberty, the
Court must maintain the balance of power between the states and
the federal government,6s

TII. THE

WASHINGTON LETTER AND THE DEBATE OVER
CONSTITUTIONAL METHODOLOGY

The New Federalists claim their ideas represent the first principles of federalism, and so it is natural to investigate the understanding of the Framers on this point. This historical inquiry is, as we will
see, a matter of some difficulty.

A. The Washington Letter
Before we begin to ponder its legal significance, a close look at
the letter itself is in order. With a few minor exceptions, the Constitution we have today is the draft produced by the Committee on
Style. Along with the penultimate draft of the Constitution, the
65. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995).
66. See 115 S. a. at 1640-42.
67. See Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities
in Perspective, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 81.
68. See id. at 88; see also text accompanying notes 36-42.
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Committee was also charged with producing a cover letter. The
Committee was small but distinguished: it consisted of Madison,
Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, Rufus King, and the Chair, William
Samuel Johnson. Thus, if nothing else, the cover letter represented
an effort by some of the Convention's most distinguished members
to explain the nature of the final product. Indeed, because the letter was approved unanimously, paragraph by paragraph, and so far
as we are aware, without debate, we must assume it reflects the
views of the delegates generally about the nature of their work, at a
time very close to the end of the process.69 It was, in short, a consensus document, signed by George Washington as President of the
Convention "by unanimous Order of the Convention."
Apart from some obligatory flourishes at the beginning and end
of the letter, it consists of four significant paragraphs. The first of
these substantive paragraphs70 begins with a remark on the need to
empower the federal government: "The friends of our country have
long seen and desired, that the power of making war, peace, and
treaties, that of levying money and regulating commerce, and the
correspondent executive and judicial authorities should be fully and
effectually vested in the general government of the Union." 71 Because of the "impropriety" of entrusting "such extensive trust to
one body of men," the letter continues, necessity demanded a "different organization" - presumably meaning the separation of
powers.
The next paragraph addresses the status of the states. "It is obviously impracticable in the federal government of these states, to
secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all: Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest." 72 The
"magnitude of the sacrifice," we are told, depends on the circumstances; the line between surrendered and reserved rights is always
difficult to draw with precision, and the difficulty was increased
here by the diverse situations of the various states.
The next two paragraphs stress the imperative of a strong government and the need for compromise in attaining that end. "In all
our deliberations," the delegates informed their fellow citizens, "we
69. See JAMES MADISON, NoTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 17frl, at
626 n.30 (1966).
70. This is actually the second paragraph in the letter; the first is in the nature of a courtly
salutation.
71. See app. at 649.
72. See id.
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kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in
which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence."73 As a result, the states were willing to give way
at the Convention on points of "inferior magnitude," in a spirit of
magnanimity and compromise. Although they recognized that no
one was likely to like all aspects of the final product, the delegates
hoped to have minimized objections to the extent possible, and it
was their "most ardent wish" that the Constitution would "promote
the lasting welfare of that country so dear to us all, and secure her
freedom and happiness."74
With that, in less than two printed pages, the Washington letter
is over, except for a flowery signature line dubbing the delegates
the "most obedient and humble servants" of the addressee, "His
Excellency the President of Congress." The letter was duly transmitted to Congress and then by Congress to the state legislatures,
along with the text of the Constitution.
B.

The Interpretation Wars

After its transmission to the states, the Washington letter seemingly vanished from the annals of history. The reasons for resurrecting it stem from recent debates over legal interpretation.
One battleground has involved statutory interpretation. In recent decades, statutory interpretation usually has involved an eclectic mix of reliance on text, statutory purpose, public policy, and
legislative history.75 In the 1980s, formalists mounted a challenge to
this conventional approach in favor of a much more restrictive
method of interpretation.76 As Bill Eskridge explains, "[f]ormalism
posits that judicial interpreters can and should be tightly constrained by the objectively determinable meaning of a statute; if
unelected judges exercise much discretion in these cases, democratic governance is threatened."77 Judge Easterbrook states:
"Laws are designed to bind, to perpetuate a solution devised by the
enacting legislature, and do not change unless the legislature affirm73. See id.
74. See app. at 650.
75. For a fuller discussion, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990).
76. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 61 (1994).
77. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 646 (1990).
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atively enacts something new.... Law does not change in meaning
as the political culture changes."78
According to formalists, legislative history should be consulted
only under very limited circumstances. It is normally irrelevant because "the law" consists of the statute Congress passed, not the
ideas in the minds of the legislators.79 Furthermore, authorizing the
use of legislative history simply empowers judges to enact their own
policy choices at the expense of the statutory languageso and allows
individual legislators to make law without obtaining the full support
of their colleagues.81 Additionally, formalists maintain, the ideas of
legislative purpose and legislative intent are incoherent. A legislature is a collective body, whose members are often in disagreement
and have no cogent set of preferences. Legislation is often a compromise between opposing interests whose only purpose is to strike
a deal. "Legislation is compromise. Compromises have no spirit;
they just are."82 Hence, when the legislature has failed to speak
clearly on an issue, it is useless for a court to try to fill the gap by
consulting the "spirit" of the statute.
The conservative critique of legislative intent raises obvious
questions about the appropriate role of original intent in constitutional cases as well. Space does not permit a full discussion of the
ongoing debate about originalism, but a review of some of its highlights will be useful in assessing the significance of the Washington
letter.
Evidence of original intent has always played a role in constitutional adjudication. In the 1980s, conservative scholars argued that
original intent should be the key factor in interpretation. This view
was widely publicized as a result of speeches by then-Attorney
General Edwin Meeses3 and then received even greater attention as
a result of the Bork confirmation hearings.84 Today, as his opinions
78. Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 69.
79. See id. at 65-66.
80. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Kenneth W. Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DuKE L.J. 371,
376.
81. See W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383, 397-98 (1992).
82. Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 68.
83. For discussion of the early phases of this debate, see Murray Dry, Federalism and the

Constitution: The Founders' Design and Contemporary Constitutional Law, 4

CoNST. CoM-

233, 233-34 (1987).
84. See BoRK, supra note 24, at 300-01. For a summary of the arguments for originalism,
see Earl M. Maltz, The Failure ofAttacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. COMMENT.
46-56 (1987).
MENT.
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in Term Limits and Lopez illustrate, Justice Thomas seems to be the
most aggressive practitioner of originalism on the Court.ss
There are two basic normative arguments for originalism: first,
that it is the only way to reconcile judicial review with majority rule
and, second, that intent is the basis for interpreting all legal documents, of which the Constitution is only one. The first argument
was nicely put by former Attorney General Meese:
The Constitution represents the consent of the governed to the structures and powers of the government. The Constitution is the fundamental will of the people; that is the reason the Constitution is the
fundamental law. To allow the courts to govern simply by what it
views at the time as fair and decent, is a scheme of government no
longer popular; the idea of democracy has suffered.s6

As John Hart Ely has explained, originalism also coheres with
an idea about legal interpretation that has wide currency in our
legal culture: it "fits our usual conceptions of what law is and the
way it works." 87 In construing a statute, Ely says, "a court obviously will limit itself to a determination of the purposes and
prohibitions expressed by or implicit in its language."BB We "might
even consider a call to the lunacy commission" if a judge goes beyond the language of the statute "to enforce, in the name of the
statute in question, those fundamental values he believe[s] America
ha[s] always stood for."B9 As Michael McConnell has argued, just
as we look to original intent when interpreting contracts and wills,
so we should do so when interpreting the Constitution.9° In short,
85. See United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1875-914 {1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642-51 {1995) {Thomas, J.,
concurring); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,115 S. Ct. 2510, 252844 {1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 115 S. Ct. 1511, 152530 {1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
86. See Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REv. 455, 465 (1986). Robert Bork eloquently reiterated this view
in his confirmation hearing: "If a judge abandons intention as his guide, there is no law
available to him and he begins to legislate a social agenda for the American people." BoRK,
supra note 24, at 300. In response to this argument, critics of originalism have questioned
whether majoritarianism should be considered our exclusive fundamental norm; whether the
adoption of the Constitution itself met the requirements of that norm as we currently understand it; and whether in fact the judicial branch should be considered less democratic than
the legislature as a source of evolving social norms. For a survey of these arguments, see
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF Tim AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
386-88 (1990).
87. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST! A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 3
(1980).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral
Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J.1501,1525 {1989) {book review) (arguing that originalism
is essentially the method used to interpret statutes, contracts, wills, and treaties).
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this argument goes, originalism is simply the normal mode of interpreting all legal documents.
At this point, conservative theorists may appear to be on a collision course with themselves. We saw earlier that conservative theorists have launched a vigorous attack on the use of legislative
history in statutory interpretation. How is this compatible with
their attachment to originalism in constitutional law? The problem
is particularly acute because of their "one size fits all" argument
that originalism is the only legitimate method of legal interpretation
for statutes, constitutions, and private legal instruments.
Resolving this problem requires a closer look at how conservative theorists define the proper role of intent in both the statutory
and constitutional contexts. In the constitutional context, Charles
Fried cautions that judges should not consider "intent" a fact about
the mental state of each drafter, as if the text itself were a kind of
second-best, and we really would "prefer to take the top off the
heads of authors and framers - like soft-boiled eggs - to look
inside for the truest account of their brain states at the moment that
the texts were created."91 Indeed, as Judge Easterbrook has
pointed out, such an exercise would be doomed to failure because
of the multiple authorship of public documents: "Peer inside the
heads of legislators and you find a hodgepodge."92
Rather than the soft-boiled-egg approach eschewed by Fried
and Easterbrook, the more defensible originalist approach to meaning is to formulate it as being objective. As Judge Easterbrook puts
it, to determine the meaning of the words used in the text, we must
consult its context: "The goals, purposes, concerns, of the authors
illuminate things. Intent then informs a reading of the text, tells us
its meaning."93 More specifically, that meaning is objective, based
on the understanding of the text by a reasonable reader of the time
who was familiar with the context.94
On this view, then, originalism is not intended to discover the
personal views of the drafters of the Constitution or the preferences
and expectations of the ratifiers. Instead, it is intended to reveal
91. Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention, 100 HARv.
L. REV. 751, 758-59 (1987).
92. Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 68 (concluding that for this reason "intent is empty").
93. Id. at 64.
94. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REv.
417, 417-19 (1898); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L.
REv. 1231, 1231 n.1 (1994); McConnell, supra note 90, at 1526-29; Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEo. LJ. 217, 227
n.23 (1994).
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the objective understanding of the text by a reasonable person of
the time. That reasonable person, in addition to other contextual
knowledge, is also assumed to be aware of the "goals, purposes, and
concerns of the authors" to the extent that such information was
publicly available.95 Interpretation of statutes is directed at ascertaining the same kind of objective meaning, thus eliminating the
disparity between constitutional originalism and statutory
formalism. 96
The remainder of this essay attempts to apply this methodology
to the New Federalism, using the Washington letter as a fulcrum.
There are two reasons for this choice of methodology. First, it is the
most coherent and defensible statement of the favored conservative
approach to interpretation. It seems appropriate to apply this interpretative approach to the predominant conservative theory of federalism. Second, even for nonoriginalists, the original
understanding has some bite. The nonoriginalist also may want to
consult other historical materials for whatever light they shed on
our traditions and aspirations as a society, but those tied most directly to the historic meaning of the text have a special claim to our
attention.
C.

The Washington Letter and Conservative Theories of
Interpretation

This formulation of originalism has the drawback of intensifying
some of the practical problems of implementing an originalist program of interpretation. As no lesser light than Justice Scalia has
told us:
[I]t is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding
of an ancient text. Properly done, the task requires the consideration
of an enormous mass of material - in the case of the Constitution
and its Amendments, for example, to mention only one element, the
records of the ratifying debates in all the states. Even beyond that, it
requires an evaluation of the reliability of that material . . . . And
further still, it requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time . . . . It is, in short, a task sometimes
better suited to the historian than the lawyer.97
95. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 64.
96. The problem of defining the "reasonable reader" and setting the parameters for her
knowledge of context is not at all a trivial one, but this formulation does at least provide a
coherent basis for some more elaborate theory of originalist interpretation.
97. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evi~ 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 856-57 (1989).
Some of the difficulties encountered by even extremely capable legal scholars are explored in
Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95 CoLUM. L.
REv. 523 (1995).
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Given this mass of material, one faces an unavoidable temptation to
"look over a crowd and pick out your friends."98 As Judge
Easterbrook has said about the quest to locate clues about meaning
in legislative history:
A Sherlock Holmes could work through the clues, and those most
reliable, and draw unerring inferences. Alas, none of us is a worthy
successor to Holmes . . . . We hear in the debates what we prefer to
hear - and our preferences differ widely. Even when all of us hear
the same thing, a search for these clues consumes resources but does not yield rewards comparable to the effort invested.99

Hence, Judge Easterbrook says, judges must eschew an excessively
nuanced approach in order to avoid unacceptable process and error
costs.1oo
The unreliability of some of the basic source materials further
complicates the originalist task. There have been recurring charges
that Madison later altered his notes, perhaps to reflect his own
changing constitutional views. After a careful investigation, based
on such matters as the watermarks on Madison's paper, historian
James Hutson has concluded that any alterations were not signi:ficant.l01 But Hutson points out that Madison gave only a highly abbreviated account of the debates, probably reporting less than onetenth of what was said.102
Hutson points out even more severe problems with other parts
of the documentary record. He concludes that the records of the
ratification debates are too corrupt to be relied upon. For example,
the Pennsylvania and Maryland debates were recorded by ardent
Federalist Thomas Lloyd, who was paid by the Federalists to delete
all of the Antifederalists' speeches. He reported only selected Fed98. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 {1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). Similarly, Felix Frankfurter warned about the dangers of trying to glean "trends
in American constitutional history" from judicial opinions coupled with other historical evidence. Also, the risk of ripping a textual comment from its historical context and reading in a
more lasting significance is great. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 63, at 9 ("We must be on
our guard against over-sophistication, and not find luminous, deeply conceived, rational
processes where there is only tentative, groping, obscure empiricism, or the instinctive and
only half conscious response of habituation to a concrete controversy.").
99. Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 61 {footnotes omitted).
100. See id. at 70.
101. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 24-33 (1986).
102. Madison averaged about 2700 words per session in June, which is only about seven
percent of the probable number of words spoken in each five-hour session. See id. at 34. The
notes also seem to give particular attention to Madison's own remarks, a tendency that is
understandable but which biases our knowledge of the debates. It also would not be surprising if he sometimes failed to resist the temptation to improve upon the oral version of his
remarks when compiling the final written version. See id. at 35.
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eralist speeches and even those seem to have been significantly
revised. 103
We do possess voluminous printed matter from the ratification
period, including most notably the Federalist Papers.104 These documents do not necessarily reflect the reasonable understanding of
the text at the time it was written. The problems resemble those
that formalists have described as affecting legislative debates: "The
goal of each legislator is to create an expression, or at least an impression, of the legislative intent on any points of interest to him or
her."tos Thus, as in evaluating other narratives, the "stories" told
by the Framers about the meaning of the Constitution must be evaluated for their typicality and accuracy, for these characteristics reflect the meaning that a reasonable reader would have placed on
the document.106 A formalist, originalist approach to statutory interpretation requires no less. Yet this task is one that, as Judge
Easterbrook and Justice Scalia point out, judges can expect to perform only with difficulty and considerable risk of error.
In many respects, the Washington letter is unique in its relative
immunity from these difficulties. First, and most obviously, it is free
from the problems of reliability that plague the records of the debates of the Philadelphia and ratification conventions. It is an official written document - indeed, the only explanation ever issued
in any official form prior to ratification regarding the meaning of
the Constitution. What it says may or may not be significant, but, at
least, we need entertain no doubt about its actual content. This in
itself makes the Washington letter far more useful than the ratification debates and, to a lesser degree, than Madison's notes.
Second, the letter is less prone to disputes about typicality than
other ratification-related documents. Hamilton and Madison, the
primary authors of the Federalist Papers, were members of the
small committee that drafted the letter, so we can be confident that
it reflects their views. But it also reflects the views of the other
members of that committee, George Washington, who signed it,
and the remaining delegates, considering that it was unanimously
approved without debate after a paragraph-by-paragraph review.
As an official document, the Washington letter has the advantage of
a formal process of enactment. Neither individual remarks at the
See id. at 22-23.
See id. at 12-24.
Slawson, supra note 81, at 396.
See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993).
103.
104.
105.
106.
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Convention nor the various documents produced during the ratification period were subject to this process of deliberation and approval before they were issued.
Third, the Washington letter is less prone than other sources to
problems of conscious or unconscious distortion by its authors. To
begin with, it was designed for a nationwide audience, so the authors would have been unable to tailor it to the exigencies of the
ratification process in particular states. Because the ratification
process had not yet begun, they were faced with a "veil of ignorance" about the politics of ratification and would have found it
somewhat more difficult to doctor their expressed interpretation of
the Constitution in a play for political support.
Finally, the Washington letter has the virtues of its defects, those
defects being its brevity and its historical obscurity. The letter was
carefully considered at the Convention and then disseminated to
the states in connection with ratification, but it never excited any
discussion. The simplest explanation for the lack of discussion is
that it simply repeated what everyone then - but not necessarily
today - already understood. The letter's brevity is also a major
virtue, given the time limitations on judges and also the risk that
more voluminous documents will be consciously or unconsciously
"mined" for material favoring a judge's position.
Thus, if we are to follow the strictures of Judge Easterbrook and
Justice Scalia in our use of historical materials, the Washington letter has a virtually unique claim to our attention. It is not only deserving of attention in its own right but very useful in minimizing
what Judge Easterbrook calls the process and error costs of utilizing
other historical materials107 because it provides a handy gauge of
their reliability and typicality. We tum, then, to a consideration of
the implications of the Washington letter for the debate over the
New Federalism.
JV.

THE WASIDNGTON LETTER AND THE TENETS OF THE
NEW FEDERALISM

As we saw in Part IT, the New Federalism centers on three propositions: (1) the states retain a - possibly primary - sovereignty;
(2) this sovereignty is reflected in the existence of presumptive limits on federal jurisdiction; and (3) the Framers viewed this separation of state and federal power as a guarantee of liberty. These
tenets form the basis for the argument that the courts should inter107. See supra text accompanying note 100.
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vene to preserve the "balance of federalism" the Framers designed.
We will consider these three tenets in order.
A.

The Question of Sovereignty

The original understanding of sovereignty is the kind of historical question that is most difficult for judges to analyze. The concept
of sovereignty had great significance for the framing generation and
has generated a corresponding amount of interest among historians.108 Unraveling the meaning of these historical records has
proven quite difficult. The Framers' debate was driven by their immediate political interests, which gave them an incentive to distort
whatever their true philosophical positions might have been. 109
Various senses of the word "sovereignty" were not carefully distinguished.110 As one historian puts it, the Framers were "politically
multilingual," using a variety of political theories whenever those
theories suited their purposes.nt
We usefully can delineate three views of the sovereignty issues:
Pure Nationalism (Lincoln's theory): The colonies declared independence as a collective body, which thereby succeeded to the sovereignty formerly held by the King. This national sovereignty always
remained with the federal government throughout a series of governmental reorganizations - first the Articles of Confederation, then
the Constitution.112
Transformational Nationalism: The states retained their separate sovereignty until the adoption of the Constitution, which created a new
national sovereign - "E pluribus unum. "113
108. For recent discussions by historians, see SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION:
THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 197- 202, 236, 248-55, 314-15, 320-28 (1993);
RICHARD B. MoRRis, THE FoRGING OF THE UNION 1781-1789, at 55-63 (1987); GoRDoN S.
Wooo, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 344-89, 524-36 (1969).
109. For example, one issue was whether the colonies had declared independence collectively, so that sovereignty at least momentarily reposed in the Continental Congress, or severally, so that it resided in the states at the time of Independence. This seemingly esoteric
question had legal implications regarding title to vast disputed areas of land. Under the
former theory, western land claimed by Virginia had instead reverted to the Continental
Congress at the time of Independence. See FoRREST McDoNALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM:
THE INTELLEcruAL ORIGINS oF THE CoNSTITUTION 146 (1985).
110. For a modem effort to do so, see Rapaczynski, supra note 22, at 346-58. For a discussion of the confusion during the framing period, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Political
Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 949, 985-87 (1993).
111. See McDoNALD, supra note 109, at 235.
112. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WouLD Go OF ITSELF: THE CoNsTITUTION IN AMERICAN CuLTURE 109 (1986) (reprinting a Civil War-era constitutional catechism); JAMES M. McPHERSON, BATILE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 246-48
(1988); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF REcoNSTRUCTION, 1865-1877, at 25-27 (1966).
113. This theory was endorsed, for example, by the majority in the Term Limits case. See
United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1855 (1995); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.1425, 1460 (1987) (arguing that although
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State Populism (Calhoun's theory): During Independence, the people
of each state separately became sovereign. When they adopted the
Constitution, they retained their separate political existences, but delegated some of their powers to the national government and some to
the state govemments.l14

As the dispute in the Term Limits case illustrates, there is no consensus about which of these theories provides the best legal fit with
the historic facts or which one was the dominant understanding of
the framing period.us
With respect to this issue, strictures about the dangers of generalist judges attempting to untangle a complex and ambiguous historical record seem especially forceful. The likelihood that busy
judges will master the vast amount of historical material is not
great. Given this large, complex historical record, a substantial risk
exists that judges - or more realistically, their law clerks116 - simply will look for friendly faces in the crowd, picking out the historical data that most clearly support their position. Hence, it is wise to
follow Judge Easterbrook's advice and reduce process and error
costs.117 The Washington letter can provide great assistance in this
respect because of its strong claim to reliability and typicality.11 8
The Washington letter sheds interesting, though not entirely unambiguous, light on this sovereignty issue. The third paragraph of
the letter plainly contemplates some loss of sovereignty by the
states and its transfer to the federal government: "It is obviously
impracticable in the federal government of these states, to secure
Article VII said the Constitution would go into effect when nine states ratified it, it "confirmed the pre-existing sovereignty of the People of each state by proclaiming that the Constitution would go into effect only between the ... states [that ratified it]." Id. at 1460. "Once
the individual states ratified the Constitution, however, they transferred their sovereignty to
the people of the nation." Id.).
114. See Amar, supra note 113, at 1452 & nn.108-09; see also McPHERSON, supra note
112, at 240; STAMPP, supra note 112, at 25. During the period before the Civil War, southern
states justified secession with the theory that the state populace, in adopting the Constitution,
had appointed the federal government to act as their agent with regard to certain functions
but that such an agency relationship did not transfer sovereignty to the federal government.
See DAvro M. PoTIER, THE IMPENDING Crus1s, 1848-1861, at 479 (1976). The people of each
state, the theory went, retained the power to nullify the agency relationship by action of a
state convention. See id.
115. Compare Justice Thomas's views in his Term Limits dissent, 115 S. Ct. at 1875-77,
with those of Justice Kennedy in his concurrence, 115 S. Ct. at 1872. As to the views of
leading modem commentators, see BEER, supra note 108, at 200-02, 236, 320-21 (endorsing
the pure nationalism theory); Amar, supra note 113; H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REv. 633, 654-60 (1993). The second theory may have
an edge among modem commentators.
116. See Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of Judicial Power, 59 Mo. L. REv. 281,
300, 306 (1994).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
118. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for
the interest and safety of all: Individuals entering into society, must
give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest." 119 Clearly, the states
were seen as losing some "rights of independent sovereignty."12o
Moreover, the drafters did not portray the Constitution as merely
an agreement between states that retained their separate existence.
The letter compares the Constitution with the social compact,
which is an irrevocable creation of a unified society - short of circumstances justifying revolution. The implications of this analogy
to the social compact later would be discussed in the Federalist
Papers:
If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must
be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political
societies enter into a larger political society, the laws which the latter
may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by its constitution,
must necessarily be supreme over those societies and the individuals,
of whom they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere treaty,
dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a government

121

Hammering the point home, the fourth paragraph of the Washington letter speaks of the "consolidation of our Union."122 The
second paragraph speaks similarly of perfecting "the general government of the Union," which seems to contemplate a degree of
political unity, rather than a mere league between entities that retain their own sovereign identities.123
There is also support for the first theory, that of pure nationalism. The second paragraph speaks of the "friends of our country,"
as if "our country" were an existing entity rather than merely a concatenation of separate units. 124 The fourth paragraph says that the
"consolidation of our Union" is "the greatest interest of every true
American," which again implies that a union already exists and that
119. See app. at 649.
120. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 457, 507 (1994) ("[A] state people can be bound by a
federal amendment even if that state people in [a] state convention explicitly reject[] the
amendment."); see also ROGER SHERMAN HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS! THEIR
NATURE, PoWERS, AND LiMITATIONS 168-69 (1917) (arguing that the union of states in 1787
bound future state conventions to the Federal Constitution and eliminated their power to
elect to do anything in contravention of the Constitution).
121. THE FEDERAUST No. 33 at 257 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1865).
122. See also James Wtlson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), reprinted
in THE FoUNDERS' CoNSTITUTION at 62 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) ("I
consider the people of the United States as forming one great community, and I consider the
people of the different States as forming communities again on a lesser scale.").
123. See app. at 649.
124. See id.
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Americans are in some sense already one people.125 Similarly, the
fifth paragraph expresses the hope that the Constitution will "promote the lasting welfare of that country so dear to us all," rather
than saying "those countries so dear to each of us. "126 More to the
point, the fourth paragraph warns that the consolidation of the
Union involves "our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence."127 The clear implication is that, in some sense,
there is already a national existence capable of being at risk, which
is to say that the United States under the Articles of Confederation
was already a nation of sorts rather than a league. 128
On balance, the Washington letter seems clearly to endorse at
least the transformational nationalism, if not the pure nationalism,
theory of sovereignty. Thus, it provides important support for the
views Justice Kennedy expressed when he broke ranks with the
other New Federalists in the Term Limits case. He argued that the
national government "owes its existence to the act of the whole
people who created it" and stated that "the people of the United
States . . . have a political identity as well, one independent of,
though consistent with, their identity as citizens of the State of their
residence." 129 Moreover, the Washington letter is inconsistent with
Justice Thomas's view that the people of the individual states retain
their separate sovereignty as "the only true source of power."130
B. Separate Spheres?
The New Federalists stress aspects of the historical record that
emphasize the limited powers of the federal government and the
powers over local matters retained by the state governments. It is
difficult to assess the import of some of these sources, although the
federal government undoubtedly was not expected to be omnipotent. As Michael McConnell points out, this particular New Feder125. See id.
126. See app. at 650.
127. See app. at 649.
128. See Letter from George Washington to Charles Carter (Dec. 27, 1787), in 1 THE
DEBATE ON THE CoNSTITUTION 612 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (arguing for ratification of
the Constitution: "I am fully persuaded [the Constitution] is the best that can be obtained at
this 1ime ... and that it or Disunion is before us to choose from."); see also Abraham Lincoln
Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE CAusES OF THE CiviL WAR
38-39 (1959). Abraham Lincoln stated that the Constitution is not a contract among states
and that "(t]he Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the
Articles of Association in 1774." Id. at 39.
129. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct 1842, 1872 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
130. 115 S. Ct at 1876.
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alist argument may "confuse the founders' expectations about how
the nation would be governed under the Constitution with the founders' understanding of the meaning of the Constitution." 131
In any event, those taking a more expansive view of federal
power also have identified support in the historical record for their
position. One historian recently referred to the Convention as a
"rally of nationalists."132 Another eminent historian observed that
the Antifederalists "had no doubt that it was precisely an absorption of all the states under one unified government that the Constitution intended, and they therefore offered this prospect of an
inevitable consolidation as the strongest and most scientifically
based objection to the new system that they could muster." 133 It is
clear that the whole purpose of the Constitution was to strengthen
the weak government the Articles of Confederation created; the
question is how far down the road to centralized government the
Framers intended to go.t34
The Washington letter's discussion of governmental powers has
a strongly nationalistic bent. It emphasizes the imperative of "consolidation of our Union" to further the interests of prosperity and
security. It thereby embraced the very term - "consolidation" that represented the worst fears of the Antifederalists. It also portrays the goal of "fully and effectually vesting" key powers in the
national government, in particular those relating to foreign affairs,
taxation, and commerce. These powers are portrayed as too important to trust to any one body of men. Conspicuously, the letter
131. McConnell, supra note 34, at 1490. For example, McConnell addresses whether the
founders expected agriculture to become an important industry:
I agree ... that they did not. Hamilton, no advocate of "states' rights," wrote that "the
supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature ... which are proper
to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction." Does it follow that the Congress of 150 years later acted iUegitimately when it
concluded that regulation of agriculture was a "necessary and proper" means for curing
national economic depression? The framers and ratifiers of the Constitution established
rules and standards for determining the scope of national authority; that those rules and
standards produce different outcomes in later circumstances is neither surprising nor
troubling.... [T]he founders' expectations about agriculture are interesting and important, but cannot take precedence over the constitutional standard.
/d. at 1490-91 (citations omitted).
132. See MoRRis, supra note 108, at 269. Because of his wartime experiences as commander of the Revolutionary Army, Washington took a particularly dim view of state prerogatives. See GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAUSM
127 (1993).
133. Wooo, supra note 108, at 526.
134. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), in 1 THE
FoUNDERS' CoNSTITUTION 150-53 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (summarizing complaints about Congress's lack of powers under the Articles).
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makes no mention of any specific areas being reserved out of federal jurisdiction.
It may be wor$ emphasizing that the Washington letter cited
regulation of commerce as one of the key purposes of the Constitution, on par with national security.135 Thus, the New Federalists are
wrong to say that the commerce power "was given no place of particular prominence" and was "only one among nearly a score of
other powers. " 136
Apart from the Commerce Clause, the federal government was
given an impressive array of economic powers. These powers were
far-reaching in their own right and rather conspicuously extend to
areas of allegedly "local" concern such as agriculture and manufacturing. A perusal of Article !137 shows that the federal government
had broad control over monetary policy and credit, via the bankruptcy power (as contrasted with the Contract Clause limitation on
the states), the exclusive power to coin money, and the power to
issue debt. The spending and taxing power gave the federal government the authority to encourage local industries through protective
tariffs and to expend funds for vaguely defined purposes.138 The
patent power also clearly intruded on the manufacturing sector, as
did the power to establish a national system of standards. This array of powers makes it dubious to define local production as a distinctively state preserve from which the federal government was
debarred.
It is understandable that the Antifederalists were alarmed by
this transfer of powers to Congress. To see how important those
powers were, suppose that a proposal were made to give the Organization of American States (OAS) the following powers: complete
control of foreign affairs within and outside the hemisphere; the
power to tax and spend money on the common welfare of the hemisphere; exclusive power to issue currency; control of commerce
135. See Alexander Hamilton's Conjectures About the New Constitution (Sept. 1787), in
1 THE DEBATE ON THE CoNSTITUTION, supra note 128, at 9 (listing circumstances that would
weigh in favor of adoption of the new Constitution including "the good will of the commercial interest throughout the states which will give all its efforts to the establishment of a
government capable of regulating protecting and extending the commerce of the Union").
136. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 268 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting). For the argument that commercial concerns were preeminent, see Jim Chen & Daniel Gifford, Law As
Industrial Policy: Economic Analysis of law in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 1315, 1322-25
(1995).
137. See U.S. CaNST. art. I.
138. Madison thought it was clear that the encouragement of manufacture was one of the
purposes of the Commerce Clause. See DREw R. McCoY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS:
JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBUCAN LEGACY 127 (1989).
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among the Americas and with other continents; jurisdiction over all
cases involving the OAS charter and even over cases involving citizens of more than one country - and then add the proviso that the
OAS's rule will be the "supreme law of the hemisphere."
In one sense, this is a limited set of powers. In another sense,
these powers are broad enough that it would be quite understandable if today's equivalents of the Antifederalists thought that almost
everything of importance had been lost. Quite likely, the full sweep
of these powers would not be realized for decades, but no one
would doubt that the potential for a tremendous reallocation of
power was present. This is not to say that the OAS's powers would
be unlimited or that the OAS courts would or would not be justified
in attempting to draw some limits in construing those powers. But
the charter would represent a shift in power away from more localized governments and a shift of the most profound kind.
As Madison said, and as the Lopez Court recounted, it is true
that the powers of the federal government are "few and defined. " 139
But the Antifederalists were right to demur from the conclusion
that, as a present-day commentator puts it, "[t]his is not the stuff of
which Leviathan is made." 14o "Four score and seven years" after
independence, after all, these powers proved quite sufficient to the
task of crushing a rebellion by half the country, including some of
the key original states, and in the process extirpating an institution
fundamental to the economy and culture of those states. That action proved feasible, it bears noting, without whatever expansion of
federal authority was to take place another seventy years later in
the New Deal.
The Washington letter also contains another important clue
about the scope of congressional power. Notice that the judicial
power is described as "correspondent" with the great powers given
Congress.141 Reversing the equation, an examination of the judicial
power can help illuminate the scope of congressional power. During the founding period, the general presumption was that a government's legislative and judicial power must be coterminous.142
As Hamilton said in Federalist No. 80, "[i]f there are such things as
political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a govern139. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
140. Lawson, supra note 94, at 1234.
141. See app. at 649.
142. See G. EowARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL CouRT AND CuLTURAL CHANGE, 18151835, at 124-127, 486 (1988); G. Edward White, Recovering Coterminous Power Theory, 14
NovA L. REv. 155 (1989); see also Powell, supra note 115, at 660-61.
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ment being coextensive with its legislature may be ranked among
the number." 143
Hamilton was speaking in terms of federal question jurisdiction,
but the remainder of Article IIJ1 44 contains an important reminder
for those who would narrowly define the sphere of federal authority
and erect a protected bastion of exclusive state jurisdiction. Jurisdiction based on citizenship is a critical segment of Article III, and
the result of diversity jurisdiction is that any dispute involving even
one nonresident could be handed to the federal courts by Congress.145 At the time, it was far from clear that a federal court
would have to follow state common law rulings - this was, after
all, nearly a century and a half before the Erie doctrine was announced.146 Note that the state courts were to be displaced in a
broad range of cases, not just commercial ones, and certainly not
just cases involving the interstate trade in goods. In addition, the
federal courts were given jurisdiction through the Admiralty Clause
of the major mode of transportation, whether or not any particular
litigation involved either citizens of different states or interstate
commerce. Once again, the idea of protecting traditional areas of
state concern from federal intrusion seems not to have been at the
forefront. The focus was on the need to enhance federal power, not
on the need to protect state jurisdiction, whether legislative or
judicial.
An understanding of the coterminous power axiom would have
prevented a misstep by the New Federalists in New York v. United
States. 147 In New York, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court
insisted that Congress lacks the power to issue affirmative mandates to state governments.148 It is quite clear, however, that federal courts do have the power to issue affirmative mandates to the
states.l49 The Washington letter's description of the judicial power
143. THE FEDERAUST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
144. See U.S. CoNST. art. III.
145. See U.S. CoNST. art. III. Consistently with the coterminous power thesis, Justice
Marshall spoke of Congress as lacking legislative power in just those cases in which the federal courts would lack diversity jurisdiction, when he denied that Congress could make "laws
affecting the mode of transferring property, or contracts, or claims, between citizens of the
same state." See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1645-46 n.4 (1995) (quoting
Marshall).
146. See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Note that judicial power retained its broad scope until just the time when legislative power had expanded enough to
take its place.
147. 505 u.s. 144 (1992).
148. See 505 U.S. at 166.
149. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Colorado
v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 185 (1982); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922).
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as "correspondent" with congressional power suggests strongly that
· the courts have no greater power to invade the prerogatives of the
states - or conversely put, that Congress has as much power to do
so as the federal courts.tso Given the unchallenged rule that the
federal courts do indeed have such power, congressional power to
issue affirmative mandates to the states necessarily follows, via the
coterminous power axiom.
C.

Federalism as a Fundamental Value

What of the role of the states as independent guardians of liberty? Was this an important animating motive behind the drafting
of the Constitution? Not if the Washington letter is any indication.
It does speak at length about the need to respect the interests of
various states so as to convince them to agree to a stronger Union.
But the letter does not say a word about the importance of maintaining the states as a check on the federal government. 1St The only
reference to the need to restrain the possible abuse of federal
power is in the second paragraph. There the letter states that the
commerce, tax, and war powers are too dangerous to entrust to any
one body, so a "different organization" was needed.1s2 The solution was to divide those powers among more than one body - the
House, the Senate, and the President - so as to prevent abuse.
Thus, the letter does refer obliquely to the separation of powers as
a safeguard against the abuse of federal power, but nowhere does it
refer, even obliquely, to federalism as such a safeguard.
This omission should not be surprising, for the evidence cited by
the New Federalists on this point stems exclusively from the ratification period, rather than the Convention or an earlier period. Justice O'Connor's opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft, for example, relies
solely on two paragraphs from the Federalist Papers for historical
support.t53 Perhaps even more strikingly, Michael McConnell's historical analysis relies quite heavily on the views of the Antifederal150. See app. at 649.
151. Indeed, a justification for granting the federal government greater powers was that,
due to self-interest, it was more likely that abuses of power would occur if the state governments held a power than if the federal government held it. See THE FEDERAUST No. 59, at
452-53 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864) ("The people of America may be
warmly attached to the government of the union, at times when the particular rulers of particular states .•• are capable of preferring their own emolument and advancement to the
public weal.").
152. See app. at 649.
153. See 501 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1991).
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ists and stresses their desire to maintain state autonomy.1s4 Indeed,
as Jefferson Powell has documented, the views of the leading New
Federalists, such as Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor,
have as much in common with those of the Antifederalists as with
those generally expressed by the Constitution's supporters.1ss In
essence, the New Federalists seem to view the Constitution almost
as if it was a compromise between those who drafted it and their
opponents.
Justice Powell's dissent in Garcia156 offers an argument for the
existence of this post-Convention compromise. According to Justice Powell,
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was rooted in
the fear that the National Government would be too powerful and
eventually would eliminate the States as viable political entities. This
concern was voiced repeatedly until proponents of the Constitution
made assurances that a Bill of Rights, including a provision explicitly
reserving powers in the States, would be among the first business of
the new Congress.157

Powell goes on to cite Samuel Adams and George Mason, both
prominent opponents of the Constitution, on the dangers of national power. He then adds that "Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every state ratifying convention."158 Then, the story
continues:
So strong was the concern that the proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a specific bill of rights, including a provision
reserving powers to the States, that in order to secure the votes for
ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded that such provisions
were necessary. It was thus generally agreed that consideration of a
bill of rights would be among the first business of the new Congress.
Accordingly, the 10 Amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights
were proposed and adopted early in the first session of the First
Congress.159
154. See McConnell, supra note 34, at 1493 (relying on the "Federal Farmer"); see id. at
1500 (quoting Patrick Henry); see id. at 1507·08 (quoting from an Antifederalist essay, Brutus); see id. at 1509 (relying again on the Federal Farmer).
155. See Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91
YALE L.J. 1317 (1982); Powell, supra note 115 (discussing Justice O'Connor). Thus, from a
historian's perspective, members of the school of thought discussed in this essay equally well
might be called the New Antifederalists.
156. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
157. 469 U.S. at 568.
158. 469 U.S. at 569 (citation omitted).
159. 469 U.S. at 569 (citations omitted). A similar theory is found in BERGER, supra note
28, at 78-80.
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This is certainly not an unconventional view of the origins of the
Bill of Rights, but it suffers from two weaknesses. The first objection is formalist. To paraphrase Judge Easterbrook, what matters is
not the intention of the Framers of the Tenth Amendment to protect the states but the language they enacted. That language is only
a truism that adds nothing of substance to the Constitution.16o The
second objection is historical. The adoption of the Bill of Rights
actually was not compelled as a part of a deal integral to the inauguration of the new government.. In fact, after ratification, interest
quickly waned in adopting a Bill of Rights, and Madison had great
difficulty in even getting the matter on the House fioor.161 Notably,
both former Federalists and Antifederalists opposed consideration
of a Bill of Rights in the first Congress. Antifederalist interest in a
Bill of Rights seems, in many cases, to have been primarily a ploy to
derail ratification.t62
On balance, whatever verbal assurances that the Federalists felt
called upon to offer on occasion during the ratification debates,
these assurances provide little ground to infer a change in the general understanding of the meaning of the document between the
time it was proposed and the time it was ratified. No doubt the
Constitution was adopted against a background of deep attachment
to the states, but the document gives little sign of constitutionalizing
states' rights as a fundamental value. Nor did the Tenth Amendment work any substantive change in federal power. As formalists
like Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook have reminded us, it is
important not to confuse the general views and desires of those who
create laws \vith the content of what they have actually enacted. 163
V.

CoNCLUSION

This essay has been concerned with the core of "original intent":
the general understanding of the meaning of the text at the time of
enactment. I find it somewhat unrealistic to posit a single original
understanding. For example, Madison took a notoriously short
time to discover that his understanding of the text was rather differ160. The Tenth Amendment is probably best understood as a counter to the Antifederalist argument that because the new government would be sovereign and because sovereignty
is inherently unlimited, all of the powers of government were necessarily possessed by the
federal government.
161. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 86, at 226. Even after he introduced the Bill of
Rights, Madison had difficulty persuading his colleagues to view the matter as important. See
id. at 231-32.
162. See id. at 227.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82, 86 & 97-99.
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ent from that of his fellow delegates Hamilton and Washington.164
It might be more accurate, therefore, to speak of the range of origi-

nal understandings that the text was capable of supporting in its
historical context. Most constitutional scholars would disagree with
the assertion that original intent, defined in these terms, is the beginning and end of constitutional interpretation, but few would reject its relevance.
Extracting some understanding of the original intent from a
large and confusing historical record is a tricky job even for professional historians specializing in the period. This task is all the more
difficult for judges and constitutional lawyers. One purpose of this
essay is to suggest a more self-conscious selection of sources that is
keyed to our normative theory of constitutional interpretation. If
our normative theory requires us to determine the general understanding of the text, we are particularly in need of reliable evidence
of widely shared understandings, as opposed to the viewpoints of a
few individuals at a particular time. We also need to distinguish
between meanings that are directly attributable to the text and
ideas reflecting background assumptions and values that may or
may not have been incorporated in the text and to do so carefully.
Unfortunately, reliability is also a problem in terms of ascertaining
the content of the key debates of the framing period.
The essay puts forward, as a candidate for particular attention in
reconstructing the original understanding, the cover letter from the
Constitutional Convention, which was signed by George
Washington on behalf of the Convention and accompanied the
transmittal of the Constitution to the Continental Congress and to
the states.
Using the Washington letter for guidance, we can gauge the extent to which the text of the Constitution was intended to reinforce
the national government as opposed to embracing the states. This
question is obviously a matter of degree. The Framers clearly did
not envision an omnipotent federal government, on the one hand,
but they did mean to strengthen it greatly. The New Federalists
have argued that the states were meant to retain sovereign regulatory authority and that the preservation of this authority was central to the constitutional design for protecting liberty. The
Washington letter does contemplate the continued independent
existence of the states and suggests that their interests will be
164. For a recent discussion of the Framers' traumatic discovery that they were deeply
divided about how to implement the powers of the new government, see JAMES RoGER
SHARP, AMERICAN Pouncs IN TIIE EARLY REPUBUC: THE NEw NATION IN CRisis (1993).
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served best by adoption of the Constitution. But it treats the states
more as a fact of life than as essential safeguards of liberty and
rejects the idea that they will retain their independent sovereignty
after ratification. Thus, to the extent that the philosophy embraced
by the New Federalists such as Justices O'Connor and Thomas
claims to flow from the original understanding of the Framers, it
has a shaky foundation.t6s

165. Of course, the results in particular cases such as Lopez may be valid, even if the
theory invoked to support them has a weak foundation. For most of us, the correctness of
these decisions cannot be decided solely on the basis of original intent. In considering the
ultimate constitutional questions presented by these cases, it is well to remember the teaching of Justice Holmes that the Framers "called into life a being the development of which
could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters." "It was enough
for them," Holmes went on to say, "to realize or to hope that they had created an organism;
it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they
created a nation." So, he concluded, questions of national power must be considered in the
light of our whole history, not merely on the basis of original intent. Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416, 433 (1920); see also Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity
and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395,443-72 (1995) (discussing constitutional evolution and the
New Deal). For further reflections on the role of original intent in constitutional interpreta·
tion, see FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 86, at 392-94. For an interesting discussion of
Madison's views on the need to respect established readings of the Constitution, see McCoY,
supra note 138, at 128. Whether Lopez and other New Federalist opinions pass muster under
this standard is a question for another day.
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APPENDIX

Letter of the President of the Federal Convention, Dated September 17, 1787, to the President of Congress, Transmitting the
Constitution.
In Convention, September 17, 1787.
Sir,
We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of the
United States in Congress assembled, that Constitution which has
appeared to us the most adviseable.
The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the
power of making war, peace, and treaties, that of levying money
and regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial authorities should be fully and effectually vested in the general government of the Union: But the impropriety of delegating
such extensive trust to one body of men is evident - Hence results
the necessity of a different organization.
It is obviously impracticable in the federal government of these
states, to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and
yet provide for the interest and safety of all: Individuals entering
into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest.
The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and
circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must
be surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and on the present occasion this difficulty was increased by a difference among the
several states as to their situation, extent, habits, and particular
interests.
In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our
view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true
American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our
prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our
minds, led each state in the Convention to be less rigid on points of
inferior magnitude, than might have been otherwise expected; and
thus the Constitution, which we now present, is the result of a spirit
of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which the
peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensible.
That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every state is
not perhaps to be expected; but each will doubtless consider, that
had her interest been alone consulted, the consequences might have
been particularly disagreeable or injurious to others; that it is liable
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to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected, we
hope and believe; that it may promote the lasting welfare of that
country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and happiness, is
our most ardent wish.
With great respect, We have the honor to be, Sir,
Your Excellency's
most obedient and humble servants,
GEORGE WASHINGTON, President
By unanimous Order of the Convention.
His Excellency the PRESIDENT OF CoNGRESS.

